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	<title>Peirce &#8211; Davood Gozli</title>
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	<title>Peirce &#8211; Davood Gozli</title>
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		<title>Peirce Series: Preface</title>
		<link>https://dgozli.com/peirce-series-preface/</link>
					<comments>https://dgozli.com/peirce-series-preface/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Davood Gozli]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 03 Jun 2019 10:30:04 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Peirce]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philosophy]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://dgozli.com/?p=1427</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[&#8220;Postscript&#8221; would be more accurate than &#8220;preface&#8221; since I am writing this at the end of the thread. I&#8217;ll be continuing my reading of Peirce, though my upcoming summer posts will not continue in this thread. What I have done here is the following: Pragmatic Maxim Settled Opinion Principles of Inquiry Signs: Part 1 Signs:...]]></description>
		
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			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
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		<title>Peirce: Metaphysics 2</title>
		<link>https://dgozli.com/peirce-metaphysics-2/</link>
					<comments>https://dgozli.com/peirce-metaphysics-2/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Davood Gozli]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 02 Jun 2019 08:50:42 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[metaphysics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Peirce]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philosophy]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://dgozli.com/?p=1439</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[We find another triad in Peirce&#8217;s categories. They are opaquely named Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness (Atkin, 2016, Chapter 6). In earlier works Peirce more descriptively calls them, respectively, quality, relation, and representation. The term &#8220;relation&#8221; might be misleading, because&#8211;as we find in Peirce&#8217;s treatment of signs&#8211;there are relations that cannot be reduced to two terms....]]></description>
		
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		<title>Peirce: Metaphysics 1</title>
		<link>https://dgozli.com/peirce-qualities-relations-representations/</link>
					<comments>https://dgozli.com/peirce-qualities-relations-representations/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Davood Gozli]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 May 2019 07:20:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[metaphysics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Peirce]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philosophy]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://dgozli.com/?p=1417</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[In this post and the next, I am concerned with C. S. Peirce&#8217;s metaphysics (Atkin, 2016, Chapter 6) and&#8211;as it has been my aim throughout this Peirce series&#8211;with drawing connections between the philosopher&#8217;s work and the recent work in general psychology (Jens Mammen and Niels Engelsted). Peirce&#8217;s method for metaphysical inquiry has something to do...]]></description>
		
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			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Peirce: Signs 2</title>
		<link>https://dgozli.com/peirce-signs-2/</link>
					<comments>https://dgozli.com/peirce-signs-2/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Davood Gozli]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 19 May 2019 11:37:49 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Peirce]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philosophy]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://dgozli.com/?p=1344</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[While reading Atkin&#8217;s Chapter 4 on Peircean semiotics, I learned that the 3 aspects of a sign (sign-vehicle, object, and interpretant) are not different entities. Rather, they are interdependent and are parts of a single whole. It is difficult to see the interpretant as a &#8220;thing&#8221;, something that is easier in the case of sign-vehicle...]]></description>
		
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		<item>
		<title>Peirce: Signs 1</title>
		<link>https://dgozli.com/peirce-signs-1/</link>
					<comments>https://dgozli.com/peirce-signs-1/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Davood Gozli]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 May 2019 04:01:41 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Peirce]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philosophy]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://dgozli.com/?p=1334</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Finally, we are on the topic of signs (Atkin, 2016, Chapter 4). I might have to revise my initial impressions discussed in this post. We shall see. The first thing that surprised me was that the &#8220;interpretant&#8221; element does NOT represent a person. It represents the understanding, the translation, which enables the link between the...]]></description>
		
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			<slash:comments>2</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Peirce: Principles of Inquiry</title>
		<link>https://dgozli.com/peirce-principles-of-inquiry/</link>
					<comments>https://dgozli.com/peirce-principles-of-inquiry/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Davood Gozli]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 10 May 2019 07:02:19 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Peirce]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philosophy]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://dgozli.com/?p=1315</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[If we suppose that inquiry is the (controlled and deliberate) application of scientific methods aimed at identifying features of reality (by relying on their permanence and stability), and if we further suppose that &#8220;truth&#8221; is at the end of this process of inquiry, then we must entertain the kinds of objections expressed by Josiah Royce...]]></description>
		
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			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Peirce: Settled Opinion</title>
		<link>https://dgozli.com/peirce-settled-opinion/</link>
					<comments>https://dgozli.com/peirce-settled-opinion/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Davood Gozli]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 08 May 2019 08:45:06 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Peirce]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philosophy]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://dgozli.com/?p=1313</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[I am working my way through Chapter 3 of Atkin&#8217;s book, where Peirce&#8217;s accounts of inquiry and truth are discussed. Very briefly, Peirce introduces belief and doubt as two complementary concepts, and he relates both of them to activity. To believe is to have grounds for a particular set of activities. By contrast, to doubt...]]></description>
		
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			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Peirce: Pragmatic Maxim</title>
		<link>https://dgozli.com/pragmatic-maxim-peirce-atkin/</link>
					<comments>https://dgozli.com/pragmatic-maxim-peirce-atkin/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Davood Gozli]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 May 2019 11:16:21 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Peirce]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Philosophy]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://dgozli.com/?p=1271</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Verifying a statement with action, or evaluating the pragmatic significance of a statement or concept, leads to the consideration of the context of evaluation and its particularities. Who is evaluating the statement? What are the overarching goals and values? What counts as a consequence? When we desire to be &#8220;pragmatic&#8221;, we should also be mindful...]]></description>
		
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