Peirce – Page 2 – Davood Gozli

Peirce: Principles of Inquiry

By Davood Gozli | 10/05/201910/05/2019 by Davood Gozli

If we suppose that inquiry is the (controlled and deliberate) application of scientific methods aimed at identifying features of reality (by relying on their permanence and stability), and if we further suppose that “truth” is at the end of this process of inquiry, then we must entertain the kinds of objections expressed by Josiah Royce and Bertrand Russell (Atkin, 2016, Chapter 3). First, we might say (with Royce) that the above description doesn’t distinguish between…

Peirce: Settled Opinion

By Davood Gozli | 08/05/201930/05/2019 by Davood Gozli

I am working my way through Chapter 3 of Atkin’s book, where Peirce’s accounts of inquiry and truth are discussed. Very briefly, Peirce introduces belief and doubt as two complementary concepts, and he relates both of them to activity. To believe is to have grounds for a particular set of activities. By contrast, to doubt is to lose those grounds. To doubt, therefore, is to lose one’s capacity for action (Why is it, then, that…

Peirce Philosophy

Peirce: Pragmatic Maxim

By Davood Gozli | 06/05/201902/06/2019 by Davood Gozli

Verifying a statement with action, or evaluating the pragmatic significance of a statement or concept, leads to the consideration of the context of evaluation and its particularities. Who is evaluating the statement? What are the overarching goals and values? What counts as a consequence? When we desire to be “pragmatic”, we should also be mindful of the restrictions we impose in our evaluation. Peirce’s approach to pragmatism is useful in this regard, particularly as he…