Philosophy – Page 5 – Davood Gozli

Grant Franks on C.S. Peirce

By Davood Gozli | 22/05/201929/05/2023 by Davood Gozli

Here is an introductory lecture by Grant Franks, the very charming comedian-philosopher, discussing Peirce as following in the footsteps of Descartes, Hume, Kant, and modern sciences. The lecture covers Peirce’s overall view of the world, the modes of thinking (deduction, induction, and abduction), though it does not directly cover Peirce’s pragmatism or logic, and its coverage of semiotics is also in the service of discussing Peirce’s overall metaphysics. But it does cover a lot of…

Peirce: Signs 2

By Davood Gozli | 19/05/201919/05/2019 by Davood Gozli

While reading Atkin’s Chapter 4 on Peircean semiotics, I learned that the 3 aspects of a sign (sign-vehicle, object, and interpretant) are not different entities. Rather, they are interdependent and are parts of a single whole. It is difficult to see the interpretant as a “thing”, something that is easier in the case of sign-vehicle and object, as the interpretant seems more like a process, something that happens (the “immediate object” is similarly closer to…

Peirce Philosophy

Peirce: Signs 1

By Davood Gozli | 16/05/201902/06/2019 by Davood Gozli

Finally, we are on the topic of signs (Atkin, 2016, Chapter 4). I might have to revise my initial impressions discussed in this post. We shall see. The first thing that surprised me was that the “interpretant” element does NOT represent a person. It represents the understanding, the translation, which enables the link between the object and the sign (or, sign-vehicle). The second thing that surprised me was that Interpretant itself is potentially a sign…

Peirce Philosophy

Peirce: Principles of Inquiry

By Davood Gozli | 10/05/201910/05/2019 by Davood Gozli

If we suppose that inquiry is the (controlled and deliberate) application of scientific methods aimed at identifying features of reality (by relying on their permanence and stability), and if we further suppose that “truth” is at the end of this process of inquiry, then we must entertain the kinds of objections expressed by Josiah Royce and Bertrand Russell (Atkin, 2016, Chapter 3). First, we might say (with Royce) that the above description doesn’t distinguish between…

Peirce Philosophy

Peirce: Settled Opinion

By Davood Gozli | 08/05/201930/05/2019 by Davood Gozli

I am working my way through Chapter 3 of Atkin’s book, where Peirce’s accounts of inquiry and truth are discussed. Very briefly, Peirce introduces belief and doubt as two complementary concepts, and he relates both of them to activity. To believe is to have grounds for a particular set of activities. By contrast, to doubt is to lose those grounds. To doubt, therefore, is to lose one’s capacity for action (Why is it, then, that…