Peirce Philosophy

Peirce: Settled Opinion

I am working my way through Chapter 3 of Atkin’s book, where Peirce’s accounts of inquiry and truth are discussed. Very briefly, Peirce introduces belief and doubt as two complementary concepts, and he relates both of them to activity. To believe is to have grounds for a particular set of activities. By contrast, to doubt is to lose those grounds. To doubt, therefore, is to lose one’s capacity for action (Why is it, then, that…

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Peirce Philosophy

Peirce: Pragmatic Maxim

Verifying a statement with action, or evaluating the pragmatic significance of a statement or concept, leads to the consideration of the context of evaluation and its particularities. Who is evaluating the statement? What are the overarching goals and values? What counts as a consequence? When we desire to be “pragmatic”, we should also be mindful of the restrictions we impose in our evaluation. Peirce’s approach to pragmatism is useful in this regard, particularly as he…

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Letters to a Stoic Writing

Complementary Views

When two friends go on a stroll together, they organize their movements with reference to each other. They adjust their walking speed, direction, and their distance to accommodate the other. Through such adjustments, each comes to occupy a position different from the companion. Each comes to a view different from the friend. I believe something similar happens in intellectual companionship. That is why I believe Catching Up with Aristotle has to be read alongside A…

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Academia critical psychology Writing

Margins and Vitality

A good friend asked me a series of questions, which were meant to act as writing probes. One of them was: “Is psychology a dead-end or is it waiting to be born?”. I decided to write an answer to it, because it is the only question on his list that bothered me. I sensed an urge to avoid it, and I was also inclined to see it as a personal attack. Notice this possible rephrase: Is what you have…

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